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Abstract: This paper presents the first evidence on the impact of external governance 
mechanisms, board diversity and independence, and management compensation on outreach and 
sustainability of microfinance institutions in Central and Eastern Europe and the Newly 
Independent States. Results indicate that among external governance mechanisms only auditing 
affects outreach, whereas regulation and rating do not affect performance. Board diversity 
improves both outreach and sustainability while larger and less independent boards lower 
sustainability. Performance-based compensation is not effective in aligning the interest of 
managers and stakeholders, and underpaying managers reduces outreach. 
   1
Governance and Performance of Microfinance Institutions in Central and Eastern Europe 
and the Newly Independent States 
 
Microfinance is the provision of loans and other financial services to the poor. The microfinance 
institution (MFI) has evolved as a result of the efforts of committed individuals and assistance 
agencies to reduce poverty by promoting self-employment and entrepreneurship. The MFI faces 
unique challenges because it must achieve a double bottom line—provide financial services to 
the poor (outreach) and cover its costs (sustainability). Microfinance is a significant and growing 
industry, yet there are no studies that explore the link between governance and performance. 
Previous studies have focused mainly on the role of innovative lending practices for improving 
outreach and sustainability, and on the impact that MFIs have on borrowers (Morduch, 1999; 
Aghion and Morduch, 2000).  
Microfinance practitioners have recognized that good governance is critical for the 
success of the MFIs  (Campion, 1998; Rock, Otero and Saltzman, 1998) but only few studies on 
regulations in microfinance have touched upon governance issues (McGuire, 1999). Closer 
examination of the role of various governance mechanisms is important because MFI managers 
control significant resources. In Central and Eastern Europe and the Newly Independent States 
(CEE & the NIS) the asset base of these organizations is estimated to be 1.2 billion dollars 
(Foster, Green, and Pytkowska, 2003). The recent waves of corporate scandals in developed 
countries indicate that there is much room for improvement of governance practices even in 
countries with well-functioning markets and in industries with established mechanisms of 
control.  
There are several reasons for the lack of studies on the effect of MFI governance on 
performance. First, performance data are considered proprietary and are hard to obtain. Although 
the majority of MFIs are funded with public funds channeled through large international 
development agencies, until recently the practice was to withhold performance information from 
the general public.
1 Moreover, there are no market mechanisms that promote transparency as 
                                                 
1 The industry practice has been to publish performance information aggregated by region, such as the data 
published by the Microbanking Bulletin. Individual data are also published but only in terms of number of clients, 
e.g. the data collected and published by the Microcreditsummit.    2
scrutiny is not in the interest of either donors or MFI managers, and thus governance practices 
are not very transparent.  
Next, the microfinance industry is quite diverse in terms of organizational types, with 
MFIs organized as non-governmental organizations (NGOs), banks, credit cooperatives or non-
bank financial institutions. This diversity complicates the analysis because it makes it difficult to 
choose appropriate conceptual framework. The literature on governance focuses mainly on 
problems of the modern public company while the governance issues in banks and in non-profit 
organizations are much less understood and empirical studies of these organizational types are 
rare. However, a 1998 industry survey shows that there are few differences in the objectives and 
performance of MFIs organized under different legal forms. Therefore, an empirical approach 
built on theoretical predictions relevant to MFIs could be used to identify the impact of various 
governance mechanisms.  
This paper uses unique data from recently conducted surveys in Central and Eastern 
Europe and in the Newly Independent States to study the relationships between governance and 
MFI performance. Results indicate that governance mechanisms impact outreach and 
sustainability differently. External governance mechanisms play a limited role as only audit 
improves breadth of outreach. After controlling for institutional, MFI-specific, and economic 
factors, external governance mechanisms do not impact sustainability. The board is an effective 
internal governance mechanism and MFIs with local boards have higher sustainability. Board 
diversity improves both outreach and sustainability. The pursuit of both outreach and 
sustainability, it seems, may create difficulties for stakeholders who, by being represented on the 
board, hope to protect their interest. For example, results show that donor representatives 
improve depth of outreach but worsen breadth of outreach and sustainability. On the other hand, 
as expected, financiers promote sustainability. Consistent with other studies on board size and 
independence, this paper finds that in microfinance larger boards and boards with higher 
proportion of insiders have worse financial results. Results also indicate that performance-based 
compensation is not effective in aligning the interest of managers with that of other stakeholders 
and underpaying managers lowers outreach. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Part 2 presents theoretical considerations 
and the empirical model, part 3 briefly describes the data, part 4 discusses the results and part 5 
offers conclusions.    3
Theoretical Considerations and Empirical Specifications  
In microfinance, governance refers to the mechanisms through which donors, equity investors 
and other providers of funds ensure themselves that their funds will be used according to the 
intended purposes.
2 Such control mechanisms are necessary because managers and providers of 
funds may have diverging preferences and objectives. For example, MFI managers may work 
towards fulfilling the mission of the MFI but they may also have preferences for non-pecuniary 
rewards. In the corporate governance literature, this problem is known as the agency problem. 
This literature refers to the manager as an Agent, who unlike the Principal, does not own the 
resources of the firm. The Principal owns the resources and bears the residual risk, that is, the 
Principal is the residual claimant of the firm’s wealth (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).
  Costs 
associated with the agency problem are called agency costs and represent costs that residual 
claimants bear in order to benefit from the professional services of managers. The goal of many 
governance mechanisms is to minimize agency costs by aligning the objectives of the owner-
Principal with the objectives of the manager-Agent.  
The key mechanisms of an effective governance framework are ownership (including 
institutional and managerial ownership), board and board structure (size and composition), CEO 
(manager) and director (board member) remuneration, auditing, information, and the market for 
corporate control (Keasey, Thompson & Write, 1997).  This paper explores all mechanisms 
besides ownership, because the database used does not contain data on ownership. 
MFIs have some unique characteristics that complicate the study of their governance. For 
example, they need to fulfill an outreach mission by serving poor clients, and many operate as 
NGOs, which makes them similar to non-profit firms. Many MFIs are similar to banks because 
they are regulated or supervised by a regulatory body and/or because they collect deposits. The 
organizational diversity of MFIs makes the empirical study of their governance difficult. This 
challenge is addressed by specifying several empirical models based on insights from the 
corporate governance literature, from the literature on governance in banks and from the 
literature on governance in non-profit organizations. 
                                                 
2 This definition is based on the definition by Shleifer and Vishny (1997) where corporate governance is defined as 
the mechanism through which shareholders (providers of funds) ensure themselves that they will receive maximum 
return on their investments.   4
Since MFIs strive to achieve outreach and sustainability, some governance mechanisms 
may impact mainly outreach and some may affect mainly sustainability depending on whose 
rights these mechanisms are supposed to protect. For example, donors may prefer outreach to 
sustainability, while private investors prefer sustainability to outreach. These two stakeholders (a 
group of people with similar interests in the organization) may install their representatives on the 
board and influence the direction of manager’s effort.  The empirical analysis addresses this 
challenge by estimating the impact of each governance mechanisms on both sustainability and 
outreach.  
 
External Governance Mechanisms  
The manager of a corporation is disciplined by market forces, through the market for managers 
and through the market for takeovers. These market forces have a limited role in microfinance 
because the market for MFI managers is thin and because most MFIs do not have true owners. 
As the microfinance industry grows and matures, however, other market forces have started to 
play important roles in promoting manager accountability. 
Competition for donations and customers, as well as the presence of for-profit firms 
affects the behavior of non-profit firms and that of MFIs. As they strive for survival, these firms 
may change their ideological perspective and mission if this would bring more donor money 
(Rose-Akerman, 1986).  Indeed, until recently information on the performance of individual 
MFIs was scant. With the increase in competition for donor funds and clients, MFIs and their 
managers are becoming more transparent.  
For example, many MFIs have their financial statement audited and certified by external 
auditors. Auditing can be an effective external mechanism because it signals to potential 
investors and donors that the manager complied with the accounting practices and did not 
misrepresent financial information. In addition, there is empirical evidence that firms’ demand 
for quality auditors is driven by active stakeholders (Ashbaugh and Warfield, 2004). Therefore, 
we expect a positive relationship between audited financial statements and MFI performance. In 
some countries or under some circumstances (organizational forms, size, and regulatory status) 
auditing may be obligatory. Therefore, it is important to include proper control variables that will 
capture these differences.    5
The competition for donor and investor funds has contributed to the appearance of MFI 
rating agencies, which serve as another external mechanism of control.
3 The evidence on the 
effectiveness of rating agencies is somewhat mixed (Partnoy, 1999). Moreover, agencies that rate 
MFIs differ from agencies that rate debt instruments of corporations because the former rate the 
overall performance of the MFI and not only the riskiness of issued debt. Managers of MFIs use 
ratings to signal their quality to future providers of funds. This suggests a positive relationship 
between rating and MFI performance. However, some authors have argued that rating may lead 
to moral hazard—once the MFI is rated, and funds are secured, managers do not have incentives 
to exercise maximum effort and may slack off (Mukhopadhyay, 2003). 
Regulation and supervision by a government agency also serves as an external 
governance mechanism for many MFIs, especially for those who accept deposits. Deposit-taking 
institutions have additional stakeholders. First, depositors become Principals because they own 
part of the resources used by the MFI. Second, if deposits are insured by the government, then 
taxpayers have a stake in the organizations because taxpayers would foot the bill if the deposit-
taking organization fails. From an efficient governance standpoint, Dewatripont and Tirole 
(1993) show that depositors should act as “bad-times” principals, while equity holders should act 
as “good-times” principals, but since depositors are dispersed, an external agency should be 
involved when (ex-post) efficiency requires interventions. That is, for organizations that collect 
deposits, regulation is an efficient control mechanism.  
Regulation could affect the performance of MFIs because it may shift the emphasis away 
from both outreach and sustainability. This could happen because regulators promote less-risky 
behavior by the manager in order to preserve the safety of the MFI itself, and more broadly the 
safety of the financial system. Less risk-taking, however, is equivalent to lower returns and may 
be against the preferences of donors and others who fund microfinance institutions with the hope 
that these institutions would serve more risky clients (the poor) and still earn profits.  
Founders of microfinance institutions would like to make sure that new MFIs have 
adequate control mechanisms. That is why the external mechanisms of control could be 
                                                 
3 In the law literature, Manne (1999) proposes a similar solution for NGO governance, namely that an external, for-
profit company (which is disciplined by market forces) serves as a monitoring mechanism. NGOs will contract with 
it to be monitored in terms of the charitable and financial aspects of their operations. However, according to Manne,  
these private organizations should not just be raters; rather they should have the right to sue NGOs to rectify 
violations.    6
complemented by an internal mechanism of control, namely the MFI board. The expectation is 
that MFIs that have a board perform better than MFIs that do not.  
Based on these theoretical considerations, the empirical model is:  
         Performancei,t  =  1 α  +  1 β Supervised i ,t  +  2 β Rated i,t +  3 β Auditedi,t  + 4 β Have_Board i,t + 
+∑
=
m
j
j
1
β Controls  i,t,j +  ti, ε     (1) 
where Performance is measured by outreach and profitability indicators for MFI i at year t; 
Supervised is a dummy for supervision/regulation by a government agency; Rated is a variable 
that indicates whether the MFI was rated at t; Audited is a dummy for having an audited financial 
statement in year t, and Have_Board is a dummy for the effect of the internal governance 
mechanism.  
  Numerous cross-country studies find that local market an institutional factors affect 
significantly the performance of financial intermediaries and that these factors need to be 
included in the empirical analysis (Barth, et al., 2003; Caprio, Laeven & Levine, 2003). 
Therefore, the empirical model includes Controls, which is a vector of variables that account for 
differences in the MFIs, in the national economy, and for level of development of various 
institutions within each country.
4 
The last element  t i, ε  is an error term. The model is estimated as a random effect model 
using the GLS method.  
 
The MFI board  
Boards are important in microfinance because of the relatively limited role of external market 
forces. The board of directors is an internal governance mechanism that helps resolve the agency 
problems between owners and managers. Corporate boards are elected by shareholders to 
monitor and advise managers. The degree of alignment of board and shareholder objectives is 
measured in the empirical corporate governance literature by the proportion of 
outside/independent directors on the board. More independent directors (non-employees, not 
related to the company) are expected to act as better monitors and advisors. Empirical studies 
                                                 
4 Detailed description of the control variables is in the Data section.   7
have found both positive and negative relationships between the proportion of outside directors 
and firm value (review of the literature in Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003).  
Non-profit boards are typically comprised of outsiders, so the role of insiders versus 
outsiders is normally not considered.
5 In this sample, the typical board consists of about 10 
percent voting insiders and that is why we estimate a model that accounts for the role of insiders, 
outsiders and implicitly for the role of “gray directors.”
 6 
In the boardroom, the major conflict is between the manager, who has incentives to 
capture the board and thus ensure his job and non-pecuniary benefits, and the directors (board 
members) who have incentives to maintain their independence to monitor and, if necessary, 
replace the manager. Directors are paid, and the market for their services should ensure diligent 
monitoring (Fama and Jensen, 1983a) although corporate directors may also have considerable 
incentives to slack off or get along with managers (Holmstrom, 1999). 
In a non-profit organization, the absence of residual claimants avoids the donor-residual 
claimant agency problems (Fama and Jensen (1983a). Internal agents (managers and employees) 
will still desire to expropriate donations, but the non-profit board allows for separation of 
management from control. Although board members of non-profit firms are rarely paid, they do 
provide continuous personal time and/or wealth, and would want to do a good job on the board. 
Board members no longer committed to the mission leave, and substitution is done by the 
remaining board members based on mutually agreed upon criteria (Fama and Jensen, 1983b).  
Since some MFIs are subject to regulation, they may share some of the specific 
characteristics of boards in regulated industries. For example, boards in banking have a larger 
proportion of outside directors than boards of firms in manufacturing (Adams and Mehran, 
2003).  
Board efficacy can be influenced by board size, with larger boards being less effective 
than smaller boards because when the board gets too big, free riding by some directors may 
become an issue (Jensen, 1993; Lipton and Lorch, 1992). This hypothesis is confirmed by 
studies on both large corporate boards and boards of small firms (Yermack, 1996; Eisenber 
Sungren and Wells, 1998). In non-profit firms, monitoring by the board declines with firm size, 
                                                 
5 Callen and Falk (1993) have defined insiders as board members who receive pay, but because pay is atypical in 
nonprofit boards, this measure is not very useful. Independence is also measured by the power of the CEO to 
nominate the board and to vote on board selection (Shivdasani and Yermack, 1999; Oster and O’Reagan, 2002). 
6 The term gray board member is used to describe board members who are not employee of the MFI but are 
involved in some of the MFI activity.     8
although fundraising increases with size (Oster and O’Reagan, 2003). Banks, however, have 
larger boards than firms in other industries (Adams and Mehran, 2003).  
To study the role of board size and board independence the following model is estimated:   
            Performancei,t =  1 α  +  1 β Bsizei ,t  +  2 β  Insidersi ,t +  3 β  Non-affiliated Outsiders i ,t
 +  
  +∑
=
m
j
j
1
β Controlsi,t,j,  +  ti, ε    (2) 
where Bsize is the size of the board, Insiders is the proportion of employees who are voting 
board members (usually the manager), Non-affiliated Outsiders is the proportion of non-
affiliated board members, Controls is a vector of variables that control for various qualities of 
institutions, economic conditions and MFI-specific characteristics such a size and age.  
Research has also focused on how board diversity affects firm performance. There is 
evidence that women directors spend more time on monitoring activities. The occupation of 
board members does not affect time spent on monitoring, but it affects fundraising (Oster and 
O’Reagan, 2003). Corporate performance is also affected by board diversity. Corporations with 
higher proportions of women and ethnic minorities perform better, according to a recent study of 
the largest Fortune 1000 companies (Carter, Simkins and Simpson, 2003).  
The MFI board has unique characteristics. It is not unusual for several major stakeholders 
to be represented on the board. The major stakeholders in an MFI are donors, equity investors, 
insiders (employees and managers), and creditors (who often provide a significant amount of the 
funding available for microloans). Some MFIs have included clients on their boards (Campion, 
1998). The relative power of these various stakeholders affects outreach and sustainability.  
 
 
To study how board diversification affects MFI performance, the following equation is 
estimated: 
Performancei,t =  1 α  +  1 β Bsize i ,t  +  2 β Women Directors i,t +  3 β Donors i ,t
 +  
+ 4 β Financiers i,t + 5 β Local Businessmeni,t + 6 β Clients i,t + 7 β Other i,t  +∑
=
m
j
j
1
β Controls i,t,j  +  t i, ε   (3)   9
where Women Directors is the proportion of women on the board, Donors is the proportion of 
donors, Financiers is the proportion of members with financial skills, Clients is the proportion of 
clients, and Others is the proportion of other professions and characteristics. Controls here is the 
vector of control variables described earlier.  
 
Managerial Compensation as an Incentive-Aligning Mechanism 
According to the agency literature, compensation that includes both a performance-based 
element and a fixed element is the best mechanism to align the interests of managers with that of 
equity holders and donors. Indeed, performance-related bonuses are used in the microfinance 
industry.  The empirical literature on corporations confirms that there is a nonlinear pay-
performance link, but the sensitivity is relatively small; in their widely cited study Jensen and 
Murphy (1990) find that, for large corporations, pay-performance sensitivity is only $3.25 for 
every $1,000 increase in shareholder value. Recent papers show that this sensitivity has been 
increasing (Murphy, 1999).  
Banks are regulated industries and regulation may substitute for or complement incentive 
features in managerial contracts (John, Mehran , and Qian, 2004). High-powered incentives 
(remuneration where the bonus part is significant) may align the interests of managers too much 
with those of equity holders, and induce managers to take higher risks at the expense of 
depositors, who would suffer most if the MFI fails. For the US bank industries, John, Saunders 
and Senbet (2000) have argued that regulation that takes into account the top management salary 
may be more effective than capital regulation in ameliorating risk-shifting incentives. In banks, 
the higher leverage (use of deposits) requires that the manager’s interest are not aligned too 
much with the interest of equity holders; thus low pay-performance sensitivity is recommended 
(John and  John, 1993).  Indeed, pay-performance sensitivity in banking has been smaller than 
that in other industries (Houston and James, 1995; John and Qian, 2003; Adams and Mehran, 
2003).  
In non-profits, many forms of incentive pay are illegal. In fact, it has been shown that the 
asymmetric information between clients and managers (that is, managers know more about the 
product than clients) makes fixed salaries the better choice for non-profit managers (Easley and 
O'Hara, 1986). Specifically, since managers get fixed salaries, they are indifferent between 
telling the truth and lying, and thus will tell the truth. Clients and donors will find the   10
information provided by non-profit managers more credible and this will lead to better funded 
and better performing firms. 
Instead of offering performance-based compensation as agency theory would suggest, 
non-profits boards may be able to recruit managers by offering compensation packages 
combining lower wages with some perquisites that only individuals committed to the mission 
will self-select to take (Handy and Katz, 1998). Additionally, the appeal of a position of power in 
non-profit firms may be sufficient to attract good managers (James, 1983). It has been shown 
that if wages paid to NGO managers are similar to those paid to for-profit managers, and if the 
NGO technology is superior to that of the for-profit firm, the NGOs will dominate the industry 
(Scott and Hopkins, 1999)
7  
To evaluate the role of managerial compensation on MFI performance the following 
empirical model is used: 
Performancei,t =  1 α  +  1 β  Higher Wage i ,t  +  2 β  Lower Wage i,t +  3 β Fixed Wage i ,t + 
 + 4 β Experience  i ,t +∑
=
m
j
j
1
β Controls  i,t,j  +  ti, ε   (4) 
where Performance includes indicators for outreach and sustainability, Higher Wage is a dummy 
that takes the value of one if the manager stated that his salary is higher than what he could get at 
an alternative job, Lower Wage is a dummy that takes the value of one if the manager stated that 
his salary is lower than what he could get at an alternative job, Fixed Wages is a dummy for 
fixed pay, namely a wage not based on performance, Experience is the number of years of 
experience (usually used to proxy a manager’s quality), and Controls is a vector of controls 
described earlier. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
7 Donors fund both for-profit and non-profit MFIs and this paper models exactly a situation where donors fund both 
NGOs and for-profit firms in the first period and only the efficient organizations in the second period. As the 
microfinance industry matures, donors are increasingly concerned with efficiency and are willing to fund only the 
efficient MFIs so the prediction that the lending/saving technology, and not staff wages, will determine survival is 
an important insight. A caveat of this model suggests that wages could even be lower if personnel are very 
committed to the MFI mission.   11
The Data 
Data for this study came from three surveys. The first survey was conducted in 1998 by the 
regional network organization, the Microfinance Center for Central and Eastern Europe and the 
Newly Independent States (MFC for CEE and the NIS). The survey collected data on MFI 
governance and performance. The second survey was conducted in 2001 by the same regional 
network. In this survey, MFIs reported their performance, organizational and product 
characteristics for the period 1998-2001. Since 2000, many MFIs have been sending annual 
reports to the MFC for CEE and the NIS and their initial profiles were updated for 2002 by this 
organization’s staff. The third survey focused specifically on governance and was conducted in 
2002 by the author in cooperation with the MFC for CEE and the NIS. The data on MFI 
performance, board characteristics and mechanisms of external control were used to develop the 
database.  
The microfinance industry is new in Central and Eastern Europe and the Newly 
Independent States and not all MFIs had a board in place at the time the survey was conducted. 
In fact, in 2001, of the 140 organizations (including credit unions and cooperatives) that 
participated in the survey only 71 had a board. These 71 MFIs were contacted in 2002 and asked 
to complete a second survey with detailed questions on governance. The response rate was 
nearly 50% as 34 organizations completed the survey. 
Credit unions and cooperatives (24 organizations) were excluded from the database 
because they have distinctively different governance.
8 The resulting sample size is even smaller 
since many MFIs turned in incomplete surveys, or reported performance for only one year and 
their information could not be used in panel data analysis. Sample size also varies across 
performance measures because many MFIs reported only a few performance indicators. The staff 
of the Microfinance Center collected and added additional performance measures to the 
database.  
Variables used in the regression analysis are defined in Table 1. In microfinance, 
performance is measured in terms of outreach and sustainability. Sustainability is measured by 
accounting-based indicators. In general, accounting measures are considered more appropriate 
for long–term studies because managers may be able to manipulate financial statements for a 
year but their ability to manipulate statements for longer periods is limited (Bhagat and Jefferis, 
                                                 
8 The most distinctive feature is the rule “one person, one vote,” which changes the decision making process.   12
2002). In this analysis sustainability is measured by return on assets (ROA), and by operational 
self-sustainability (OSS). Operational self-sufficiency measures how well the MFI can cover its 
costs through operating revenues. It is a better measure in this context because ROA is self-
reported and does not necessarily include the value of donations, in-kind subsidies and inflation 
that MFIs should be incorporating in this ratio. 
Outreach, in turn, is measured in two dimensions—breadth and depth. Breadth of 
outreach is measured by the logarithm of the number of active borrowers; that is, borrowers who 
currently have a loan. Depth of outreach is measured by a variable DEPTH, which is the average 
loan size divided by the annual GDP per capita, all in US dollars.
9 Smaller value of this variable 
is proffered because smaller values indicate that poorer people are being served. Conversely, 
higher values of DEPTH  indicate that wealthier clients are being served. Therefore, from a 
poverty-alleviation perspective, a negative impact on DEPTH is preferred because it indicates 
that this variable improves the depth of outreach by helping serve poorer people. 
Table 2 presents the summary statistics of the variables used in the regression analysis. 
The values are the averages for all applicable years. Numerous control variables are used to 
account for the differences in MFIs and in the conditions in which they operate. Data on 
individual characteristics include MFI size measured as the logarithm of total assets, MFI age in 
years, and MFI type—NGO, Non-bank Financial Institution, and Bank which is the omitted 
dummy in the regression analysis. 
Differences in economic conditions across countries are controlled for by the size of the 
economy (Economy Size) measured by logarithm of GDP and by the average inflation rate 
(Inflation) measured by the average consumer price index. Differences in institutional 
development across countries are captured by three indexes computed by the EBRD. These 
indexes approximate the level of banking sector reform (BSR), regulations that promote 
competition (CP), and infrastructure reform (IR). The first index captures the level of regulation 
of MFIs and their competitors. The last two indexes affect clients. If clients operate in a 
repressive environment, with poor infrastructure and in a regulatory environment that stifles 
competition, then such clients will be more difficult to serve in a profitable manner, holding 
constant the effort of managers and board members. 
 
                                                 
9 GDP per capita data were obtained from the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD).   13
Discussion of the Results 
Results in Table 3 indicate that external governance mechanisms are not effective. Supervision 
by central banking authorities does not affect either sustainability (measured by the OSS ratio) or 
outreach (measured by the number of active clients).
10 This result is consistent with previous 
empirical studies which found that governments should not rely exclusively on direct regulation 
of banking activities to promote bank efficiency (Barth, Caprio, and Levine, 2004). Rating by an 
independent agency does not have an effect on any of the performance measures. This is an 
important result because MFIs have been spending significant resources to be rated.
11 Among all 
external governance mechanisms only auditing affects outreach and its magnitude is 
significant—holding all other factors fixed, MFIs with audited financial statement reach 100 
percent more borrowers. 
The MFI board is an important governance mechanism. Holding all other factors fixed, 
MFIs with a local board have on average 52 percentage points higher OSS than MFIs without a 
local board. A more detailed investigation of the MFI board is, therefore, justified not only by 
the theory but also by the data for Central and Eastern Europe and the Newly Independent States. 
Results on the effect of board size and board independence on MFI profitability and 
outreach are interesting. Agency theory suggests that board independence influences MFI 
performance positively. Indeed, in Table 4 the coefficient on the proportion of insiders on the 
board is negative for all the performance measures but it is statistically significant only when 
performance is measured by ROA. On average replacing one director with an insider lowers 
ROA by 6.6 percentage points.
12 
  The specification for OSS in Table 4 also shows results consistent with the literature that 
finds a negative relationship between board size and financial results. Holding all other factors 
fixed, one additional board member lowers OSS by 10 percentage points.  
Board diversity matters in Central and Eastern Europe and the Newly Independent States 
(Table 5). Boards with higher proportions of women on the board reach more and poorer 
                                                 
10 Table 3 does not show the estimates on the effect of external governance mechanisms on ROA and DEPTH 
because an F test failed to reject the hypothesis that the independent variables are jointly significant. In addition, the 
coefficients on the external governance factors were not significant in these regressions. 
11 It should be noted, however, that the data are from the 1998-2001 period. While some rating agencies like 
ACCION’s CAMEL operated earlier, rating was not popular. 
12Replacing one board member refers to replacing one board member of a type not affecting performance with a type 
affecting performance. The calculation is based on 0.17 increase in the proportion of the relevant board member 
which is about one person on a board consisting of 6 board members (the average value for the sample).   14
borrowers, and have higher returns on assets. Specifically, replacing one board member with a 
woman would help reach 48 percent more borrowers, improve ROA by 3.5 percentage points 
and lower the index of outreach by 57 percentage points (equivalent to serving poorer 
borrowers). Replacing one board member with a donor would help the MFI serve poorer clients 
(the index of depth of outreach would fall 35 percentage points) but it would also lead to fewer 
borrowers (by 35 percent), and lower levels of OSS (by 25 percentage points). Donors’ emphasis 
on serving poorer borrowers may be diverting attention from sustainability. Furthermore, the 
ability of donor representatives to raise funds may bring in easy money, and thus lower 
incentives to achieve high level of OSS. As expected, board members with banking and financial 
skills improve sustainability (replacement of a board member with a financier improves ROA by 
4.25 percentage points and OSS by 17 percentage points) without affecting outreach. Somewhat 
surprisingly, local businesses representatives on the board do not affect sustainability but 
improve breadth of outreach (one replacement with such a board member by 42 percent), which 
indicates that this category may include “useful board members.”  
Results concerning the role of clients on the board are interesting. This category of board 
members affects sustainability positively (OSS would be improved by 27 percentage points for a 
replacement with a client), but this would be at the expense of depth, as clients-board members 
seem to be pushing for serving wealthier borrowers (one replacement by a client would increase 
the index of depth of outreach by 80 percentage points).  
As suggested by the literature on non-profit firms, incentives that align the interest of 
managers with the interests of stakeholders work differently in microfinance. MFI performance 
is not affected by the type of wage; that is, it does not matter whether managers are paid a fixed 
wage, or fixed wage plus a performance-based bonus (Table 6). What matters is that managers 
are adequately compensated, as lower wages affect outreach negatively. Everything else equal, 
an underpaid manager reaches 2.4 times less borrowers than a manager who is adequately or 
overcompensated. Wages higher than those in alternative employment do not lead to significant 
improvements in outreach and sustainability, but this specific result should be regarded with 
caution because answers to questions on income are notoriously unreliable. More experienced 
managers seem to be interested in lending to poorer borrowers, but the magnitude of this effect is 
small—10 extra years of experience would lower the index of depth of outreach by only 35 
percentage points.   15
The empirical analysis shows that economic, institutional and MFI specific factors should 
be taken into consideration when evaluating the performance of MFIs and their managers. Size 
of the economy impacts positively outreach and sustainability, while high inflation harms both. 
Banking sector reform influences sustainability negatively but improves depth of outreach, 
perhaps because competition from other banks forces MFIs to serve poorer clients. Infrastructure 
reform improves both outreach and sustainability, as it decreases costs to MFIs and their clients. 
Improvement in competition policy impacts depth by making wealthier borrower more attractive. 
Everything else equal, NGOs and non-bank financial institutions have about 200 percentage 
points better depth of outreach; that is, these institutions serve significantly poorer borrowers.  
 
Conclusion 
This paper studies how governance mechanisms affect performance of MFIs in Central and 
Eastern Europe and the Newly Independent States. Using insights from the corporate governance 
literature, the literature on non-profit boards and the literature on boards of banks, the paper 
examines the impact of external mechanisms of control, management remuneration, and board 
independence and diversity, while holding constant institutional, macroeconomic and MFI-
specific factors. Not all known governance mechanisms affect performance and moreover, 
different factors affect outreach and sustainability. 
External governance mechanisms, specifically supervision by regulatory authority and 
rating by independent agency, are not effective mechanisms of control. Only auditing has a 
positive effect on outreach. Internal governance mechanisms, particularly the board matter, as 
MFIs with local boards achieve better sustainability. Consistent with other studies on board size 
and independence, this paper finds that in microfinance larger boards and boards with higher 
proportion of insiders have worse financial results. 
Policies to promote board diversity seem appropriate. The presence of women on the 
board improves depth and breadth of outreach as well as sustainability. Somewhat surprisingly, 
local businessmen on the board do not affect sustainability but improve breadth of outreach 
while members with diverse skills (the category “other”) improve sustainability. The pursuit of 
both outreach and sustainability, it seems, may create difficulties for stakeholders who, by being 
represented on the board, hope to protect their interest. For example, results show that donor   16
representatives improve depth of outreach but worsen breadth of outreach and sustainability. On 
the other hand, as expected, financiers promote sustainability. 
The analysis sheds light on an important question: “Should MFI clients be allowed on the 
board?” Advocates have argued that clients are stakeholders because their welfare is affected by 
the performance of the organization, and therefore clients should be represented on the board. 
Results here show that having clients as board members improves sustainability at the expense of 
depth of outreach; that is, at the cost of shifting the focus toward serving richer borrowers. 
This study finds that traditional mechanisms designed to align the interests of managers 
with those of other stakeholders have a limited role in microfinance. Performance–based 
compensation of managers does not improve MFI performance. However, offering lower salary 
so that only managers committed to the mission would take the job (as suggested by the NGO 
literature) is ineffective because MFIs with underpaid managers achieve less outreach. Finally, 
manager experience does not affect sustainability and its impact on depth of outreach is small in 
magnitude. 
This paper presents the first evidence on the link between governance mechanisms and 
performance in microfinance. Clearly, while some traditional governance mechanisms seem to 
work, more comprehensive data collection and more research is needed to better understand how 
various governance mechanisms affect the performance of microfinance institutions.  T
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 Table 2: Summary Statistics 
 
Variable  No. of observations  Mean  Std. Dev. 
ROA (%)  166 3.038  29.290 
OSS (%)   215 91.990  45.380 
No. Active Borrowers  380 7,268  64,943 
DEPTH (%)  327 425  134 
Total Assets  
($ thousands) 
 
189 
 
6,437 
 
26,935 
Supervised  380 0.368  0.483 
Audited  380 0.745  0.437 
Rated  325 0.262  0.440 
Have_Board  435 0.773  0.420 
Bsize  268 6.09  2.258 
Women  258 0.232  0.230 
Donor  259 0.183  0.301 
Financiers   258 0.209  0.274 
Local Businessmen  258 0.127  0.177 
Clients  259 0.040  0.138 
Others  258 0.036  0.140 
Insider  141 0.115  0.187 
Independent  138 0.582  0.332 
Meetings  138 4.971  2.991 
Higher Wage  170 0.118  0.323 
Lower Wage   170 0.324  0.469 
Fixed Wage   138 0.768  0.424 
Experience  170 14.338  7.718 
LogTa  193 13.913  1.910 
MFI age  380 2.881  1.859 
Economy Size  380 23.182  1.435 
Inflation  380  0.181 0.301 
IR  380  1.971 0.530 
BSR  380  2.206 0.602 
CP  380  1.865 0.623 
NGO  380  0.659 0.475 
Non-bank FI  380  0.087 0.283 
 Table 3: Random effect estimates of the impact of external mechanisms of control 
 
 OSS  logNab 
Constant  36.974 1.665 
  (0.27) (0.57) 
Supervised  -15.822 -0.343 
  (0.80) (0.80) 
Audited  16.999 1.044*** 
  (1.12) (3.10) 
Rated  10.968 0.498 
  (0.58) (1.27) 
Have_Board  52.622** -0.362 
  (2.42) (0.77) 
Controls     
   logTa  0.344 0.217*** 
  (0.14) (3.83) 
   MFI age  4.149 0.223*** 
  (1.17) (2.93) 
   Economy Size  0.171 0.055 
  (0.03) (0.44) 
  Inflation  -85.432 -2.799* 
  (1.27) (1.88) 
   IR  38.942** 0.903** 
  (2.54) (2.55) 
   BSR  -42.635** -0.712 
  (2.00) (1.50) 
 
 
  
   NGO  2.365 0.170 
  (0.08) (0.28) 
   Non-bank FI  12.6238 0.247 
  (0.37) (0.37) 
    
R-squared(overall)  0.27 0.52 
Observations  96
1 180 
Number of MFIs  38
2 60 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses         
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   
1 Includes total number of observations for all MFIs (except credit unions) for all available years 
up to 2001. The number of observations varies across measures of performance because of 
incomplete performance data.  
2 Number of groups with at least 2 complete observations per year. 
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Dependent variable measuring sustainability is operational-self sustainability (OSS), defined as 
Operating revenue / (Financial expense + Loan Loss Provision + Operating Expense). It 
measures how well the MFI can cover its costs through operating revenues. Dependent variable 
measuring breadth of outreach is log of the number of total borrowers (logNab). Supervised is a 
dummy variable that indicates whether the MFI is supervised by a government agency; Audited 
is a dummy variable that indicated whether the MFI had audited financial statements for the 
year; Rated is a dummy variable that equals one if the MFIs was rated. Control variables for 
MFI-specific factors are log of the dollar value (in thousands) of total assets (logTa), MFI age in 
years, NGO, and Non-Bank FI; control variables for the impact of economic factors are Economy 
Size, measured as log of the country GDP in US$; Inflation measured by as average CPI 
(expressed in percentage). Control variables for institutional characteristics are EBRD index of 
infrastructure reform (IR), and EBRD index of banking sector reform (BSR). 
 
 Table 4: Random effect estimates of the impact of board independence 
 
 
  ROA
1  OSS
1  logNab
1  DEPTH
1 
Constant  -110.846 63.126  5.363  194.822 
  (1.21) (0.25)  (0.60)  (0.43) 
Bsize  1.170 -9.852**  -0.078  0.798 
  (0.72) (2.36)  (0.49)  (0.10) 
Insider  -39.774* -115.559  -2.731  -39.352 
  (1.66) (1.55)  (1.18)  (0.34) 
Independent  4.915 31.259  0.937  -65.408 
  (0.42) (0.98)  (0.83)  (1.16) 
Controls         
   LogTa  -0.376 0.198  0.056  -0.619 
  (0.56) (0.09)  (0.91)  (0.20) 
   MFI age  0.358 3.303  0.174*  3.098 
  (0.25) (1.06)  (1.76)  (0.62) 
   Economy Size  8.286 9.074  -0.020  36.256 
  (1.61) (0.65)  (0.04)  (1.55) 
   Inflation  -9.110 -214.949**  -7.811***  120.042 
  (0.27) (2.24)  (3.08)  (0.96) 
   IR  16.778*** 50.698***  1.412***  -18.128 
  (3.52) (3.84)  (3.47)  (0.88) 
   BSR  -55.404*** -100.475**  -1.557 -
158.651***
  (3.69) (2.48)  (1.41)  (2.81) 
   CP  7.897 10.679  0.065  160.421 
  (1.34) (0.61)  (0.13)  (0.67) 
   NGO  9.900 -12.871  1.993*  -
188.435***
  (0.89) (0.26)  (1.66)  (3.15) 
   Non-bank FI  5.096 -80296  2.042  -164.891** 
  (0.44) (0.16)  (1.61)  (2.49) 
        
R-squared (overall)  0.54 0.55  0.55  0.58 
Observations  56
2 65  75  71 
Number of MFIs  22
3 23  26  25 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses         
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%         
1 The sample includes only MFIs with a board.
 
2 Includes total number of observations from the 2002 governance survey. The number of 
observations varies across measures of performance because of incomplete performance data.  
3 Number of groups with at least 2 complete observations per year. 
 
 
   22
Dependent variables measuring sustainability are return on assets (ROA) and operational-self 
sustainability (OSS = Operating revenue/(Financial expense + Loan Loss Provision + Operating 
Expense), which measures how well the MFI can cover its costs through operating revenues. 
Dependent variables for outreach are log of the number of total borrowers (logNab), which 
measures breadth of outreach, and DEPTH (DEPTH=Average Loan Size/GDP per capita), which 
measures whether poorer/richer borrowers are being served. Higher values of DEPTH are less 
desirable and indicate that richer borrowers are being served. Bsize is the number of board 
members; Insider is the proportion of board members who are also employees of the MFI; and 
Independent is the proportion of independent board members. MFI-specific control are log of the 
dollar value (in thousands) of total assets (logTa), MFI age in years, NGO, and Non-Bank FI; 
control variables for the impact of economic factors are Economy Size, measured as log of the 
country GDP in US$; Inflation measured as average CPI. Control variables for institutional 
characteristics are EBRD index of infrastructure reform (IR), EBRD index of banking sector 
reform (BSR), and EBRD index of competition policy (CP). 
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